This paper investigates whether U.S. presidential administrations choose to exert more influence over international financial institutions when they have less control over bilateral aid because of a divided U.S. government. Reexamining four empirical studies of the World Bank, we demonstrate that findings of U.S. influence are driven by the years in which the U.S. government was divided. This provides a richer picture of when and why the U.S. exerts influence in multilateral settings and an alternate explanation to persistent questions about the role of international organizations in the international political economy.
Introduction
Over the last ten years, a sizeable empirical literature on foreign aid has established that the U.S. uses both bilateral aid and influence in international financial institutions (IFIs) to pursue its foreign policy objectives. The parallels between bilateral and multilateral aid in serving U.S. interests are particularly clear regarding non-permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2009A,B) and political aid cycles (Faye and Niehaus 2012; Kersting and Kilby 2016) .
But what factors influence the U.S. choice between bilateral and multilateral aid? Following Milner and Tingley (2015), we explore the role of U.S. domestic politics and investigate whether the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid depends on the U.S. administration's relations with the Congress. When relations are particularly contentious, we expect that bilateral aid is less available as a foreign policy tool and so the U.S. administration will increase pressure on international organizations to deliver resources in support of U.S. administration goals. We test the hypothesis that previous evidence of U.S. influence in IFIs is largely driven by periods of divided U.S. government. This test is conducted via large N analysis of World Bank operations, using measures of division in the U.S. government, World Bank outcome variables (principally commitments, disbursements, and project ratings), and borrowing countries' geopolitical importance to the U.S.
The evidence supports the hypothesis that previous findings of U.S. influence over the World Bank are largely driven by periods of divided U.S. government. Evidence of selective enforcement of World Bank loan conditionality in favor of U.S. friends from Kilby (2009) is driven by years with a divided U.S. government and not by those occasions where the President can work with a Congress of his own party.
The pattern repeats in the analysis of U.S. informal influence over World Bank lending more broadly reported in Kilby (2013A) . We also observe the bias in project ratings by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in favor of countries holding non-permanent seats in the UNSC uncovered by Kilby and Michaelowa (2016) but only for those years with a divided U.S. government. Finally, electioneering in support of U.S.-friendly incumbents via faster disbursement of World Bank loans in the run-up to borrowing country elections reported in Kersting and Kilby (2016) is also driven largely by periods of divided U.S. government. This repeated pattern suggests that the exercise of influence in IFIs-when IFI activities substitute for bilateral aid-is a function of domestic politics.
The next section of this paper reviews some of the existing literature on the domestic politics and geopolitics of bilateral and multilateral aid. We pay special attention to the relationship between the president and Congress as far as it impacts the allocation of foreign aid. The section concludes with a review of the papers on U.S. influence over the World Bank on which we draw for our empirical analysis.
Section 3 lays out our research methodology, which builds on the aforementioned studies and adds the dimension of divided government. Section 4 presents our estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Two parallel literatures have developed, one exploring how U.S. bilateral aid promotes U.S. national interests, another how lending by IFIs promotes U.S. national interests. In some cases, the parallels are very direct. For example, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) demonstrate that U.S. bilateral aid to developing countries increases dramatically when these countries serve as non-permanent members of the UNSCand decreases just as dramatically when their UNSC terms end. Dreher et al. (2009A) likewise document a jump in the number of World Bank loans approved for countries serving as non-permanent UNSC members that subsides when the country's term ends. Dreher et al. (2009B) finds similar pattern at the IMF, with higher IMF program participation rates while countries hold a non-permanent UNSC seat. (See also Vreeland and Dreher (2014) .) Another example is the parallel between Faye and Niehaus (2012) on the one hand and Kersting and Kilby (2016) and Hlavac (2013) on the other. Faye and Niehaus find a pre-election increase in bilateral aid to incumbent governments that are friendly with the donor and a preelection decrease in bilateral aid to incumbent governments that are not friendly with the donor. Kersting and Kilby find the same pre-election pattern for World Bank investment loan disbursements to incumbent governments that are friendly with U.S. Hlavac documents a similar pattern for UNICEF. In short, there is ample evidence that the U.S. uses its influence in IFIs to pursue some of the same foreign policy objectives that it pursues via bilateral aid.
This paper sits at the intersection of these two literatures, examining how U.S. decision-makers determine which instrument-bilateral aid or multilateral aid-to select to pursue foreign policy goals like those identified above. We build on Milner and Tingley (2015) who present an empirical analysis of how U.S. presidents pick between foreign policy instruments (policy substitution). Their core argument is that the use of some instruments is more constrained than others based on relations between the administration and Congress and on the level of distributional consequences. The result may be a suboptimal policy mix where domestic politics rather than foreign policy goals drive the choice of policy instrument. Our topicthe choice between bilateral and multilateral aid-is an interesting example of this same phenomenon not explored by Milner and Tingley.
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Our hypothesis requires that Congress does in fact constrain a president's foreign policy agenda, including the allocation of foreign aid, at least sometimes. This assumption somewhat conflicts with the idea that the president is given a free hand in foreign affairs as opposed to domestic affairs by Congress, a view articulated in the "two presidencies" thesis by Wildavsky (1975) . Recent work by Canes-Wrone et al. (2008) outlines three main elements leading to an advantage of the president over members of Congress regarding foreign policy: a first-mover advantage, superior information and stronger electoral incentives. However, we claim that all three of these reasons for Congress to defer to the President are weaker in the case of foreign aid.
First, the first-mover advantage relates to quick responses to international crises and emergencies whereas foreign aid initiatives are often slow-moving budgetary items and thus subject to negotiations (a point that is also made by Caddel 2013).
Second regarding the informational advantage, Canes-Wrone et al. (2008, 4) write that the president knows more about "the relevant players in different regions of the globe, about the strategic consequences of different policies, about the status of ongoing diplomatic negotiations and about the effects of covert operations." This is contrasted to domestic affairs, where members of Congress are more knowledgeable in general and may turn to interest groups for independent assessments. But this latter option is also available to them in the case of international aid allocation since there is a large number of interest groups with access to high quality information, operations in recipient countries and a strong willingness to communicate their preferences to legislators. So if the "two presidencies" thesis requires Congress to have lower confidence in their information and consequently cede more power to the executive, it would seem that it does not apply as strongly to foreign aid allocation decisions. In addition, Canes-Wrone et al. note that Congress would hand over power less readily for foreign policy initiatives with a domestic policy component. Most foreign aid proposals do have a clear domestic impact (for example, food aid that matters to agricultural states and agribusiness or infrastructure aid that matters to states with significant employment shares in heavy industry).
Third, the 'electoral incentives' argument builds on the fact that presidents will be remembered for their foreign policy legacy, while members of Congress will not. As a result, the president is more invested in foreign policy and gets his way more often than in domestic affairs. It is not clear that this asymmetry is significant if we focus exclusively on foreign aid. The executive may see particular foreign assistance proposals as complementary to a broader foreign policy agenda. However, if the domestic impact (both in terms of the cost to tax-payers and the benefits for specific constituencies and lobbying groups) of the proposals is sufficiently large, members of Congress will be highly interested in the outcome as well.
Being viewed as the congressperson who secured the most contracts for their district (or, conversely, who stood fast against "money down a foreign rat hole") is also a strong legacy incentive.
Overall, we conclude that the arguments for the "two presidencies" view are much weaker in the case of direct foreign assistance. For that reason, the climate of cooperation between Congress and the executive is likely to influence which channels the administration employs when pursuing its interests through the allocation of foreign aid. Caddel (2013) This is part of a larger pattern. Gwin (1997) argues that exerting U.S. influence in the World Bank requires instead working behind the scenes (pressuring World Bank management, making deals with other shareholders, etc.), something the U.S. administration can do much more effectively than the U.S.
Congress. In addition, because such influence flows through informal channels, the Congress cannot readily observe administration actions. Thus, at least in the short run, the U.S. administration can use multilateral loans as an instrument of foreign policy without consent from Congress. Strand and Zappile (2015) find some support for this in U.S. ED voting records for the IBRD that suggest U.S. bilateral aid and U.S. support for multilateral lending are substitutes.
In contrast, Daugirdas (2013) argues that Congressional influence has been underestimated since executive branch agencies want to avoid incurring the wrath of Congress (with consequences in subsequent budget cycles). She presents evidence that these agencies go beyond the letter of the law in terms of implementing Congressional mandates, for example when casting votes in the World Bank and that, while Congressional opinions do not influence the approval of World Bank projects brought to a vote, they can influence which projects are brought to a vote.
While Congressional relations no doubt play an important role in agency decisions, they are not always determinative. Daugirdas (2013, 530) identifies cases where increased multilateral lending to human rights abusers effectively negated Congressional attempts to reduce aid to these regimes, and she points to subsequent Congressional attempts "to limit the executive branch's ability to circumvent Congress's preferences by turning to multilateral institutions to distribute resources." This notion that international organizations (and specifically the World Bank) provide the administration with a path around the Congress is also voiced by Abbott and Snidal (1998, 18) and lies at the heart of our analysis.
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Our paper draws directly on four previous empirical studies on the political economy of the World Bank.
The first paper (chronologically) is Kilby (2009) Finally, Kersting and Kilby (2016) explore the speed of World Bank loan disbursement in the context of competitive executive elections in the borrowing countries. Using newly available monthly data on disbursements, this paper finds faster investment project loan disbursement in the run-up to a competitive executive election as compared to other times. However, this pattern only holds for incumbent governments that are aligned with the U.S. in UNGA voting. For incumbent governments that vote against the U.S. in the UNGA, investment project loan disbursement is slower in the run-up to a competitive executive election as compared to other times. This pattern is consistent with U.S. influence over World Bank lending that helps keep allies in office and opponents out of office.
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Research Design
The U.S. administration's choice between bilateral aid and multilateral aid as a foreign policy tool should depend on the relative cost of these two options. Ceteris paribus, when an uncooperative Congress makes bilateral aid difficult to use ("expensive"), the administration should more often select the multilateral route. One factor impacting the administration's ability to use bilateral aid is division within the U.S. government since the president will have a harder time winning the consent of a divided or oppositional Congress. We thus expect to find more evidence of U.S. influence over World Bank decision making during divided U.S. governments than otherwise.
To investigate this, we revisit the four studies of U.S. influence in the World Bank listed above. We take a very simple approach, partitioning the data into observations where the U.S. government was divided and observations where it was not (i.e., the administration and both chambers of the Congress were all controlled by the same party).
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Then we re-estimate the preferred specification separately on both samples. Based on the arguments above, we expect stronger U.S. interest effects (i.e., larger point estimates, higher levels of statistical significance) when the U.S. government is divided. As compared to using a pooled sample and a specification that interacts a divided U.S. government dummy with the key explanatory variables, splitting the sample avoids the complexities of interpreting triple interaction terms.
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However, the data structure in Kersting and Kilby (2016) does not allow a simple division along these lines. In that paper, some data reflect averages over time so that the measure of divided U.S.
government is no longer a binary variable but rather a continuous variable, ranging between zero and one. To avoid arbitrarily splitting the sample at some value of the divided U.S. government variable, we instead estimate just one equation on the entire sample but include interaction terms.
For simplicity, the studies we re-examine are ones where: 1) we were authors or co-authors; 2) the geopolitical indicator is not U.S. bilateral aid (to avoid endogeneity concerns); 3) timing is clear so that divided U.S. government can be defined appropriately; and 4) the study examines the World Bank.
Following these criteria, we re-examine the studies outlined in the literature review above: Kilby (2009 , Michaelowa and Kilby (2016) , and Kersting and Kilby (2016) . We do not re-examine Kilby 4 There is a plethora of alternative approaches. More sophisticated measures we experimented with include the measure of strength of the president's party suggested by Hughes and Carlson (2015) , the ratio of the number of failed bills to the number of total bills and various measures of polarization and/or ideological distance based on Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . The results using these more complicated measures are similar but less clear, leading us to prefer the simplest option. We also get similar results using a variable based on the number of articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post about conflict and deadlock in Congress. 
Results
We first present results for studies where the simple approach-re-estimating in subsamples with divided and undivided U.S. governments-is feasible. For these studies, which use annual data, we lag divided government by one year to allow time for influence to translate into action. We then turn to the reestimation of Kersting and Kilby with interaction terms for the divided government variable. The discussion below focuses on the key political economy variables (results for which are highlighted in the tables); for a complete discussion of aggregate results including control variables, see the relevant original study. Column 1 replicates results from the preferred specification in that paper ( Column 1 replicates the results from Column 3 of Table 3 in Kilby (2009) , identifying a pattern consistent with selective enforcement of conditionality. Higher inflation is associated with lower disbursement for countries that are not U.S. friends but there is no apparent relationship between inflation and disbursement for U.S. friends. Likewise, devaluation is linked to higher disbursement but only for countries that are not U.S. friends. In short, there is evidence of macroeconomic conditionality for countries that have not made voting concessions to the U.S. but there is no evidence of such conditionality for countries that have.
The Political Economy of World Bank Conditionality
Column 2 limits the sample to years when the U.S. government was divided (again, lagged by one year to allow time for influence to turn into action). The results for the key macroeconomic variables and interaction terms are largely unchanged except for a slight increase in the magnitude of point estimates and t-statistics. We still see statistically significant effects consistent with enforcement of conditionality for non-U.S. friends and no evidence of conditionality enforcement for U.S. friends. These results are in sharp contrast to those in Column 3 where all these coefficient estimates change sign and cease to be statistically distinguishable from zero. The sample size for Column 3 is substantially smaller (223) so loss of significance might not be that telling but the change in point estimates is. The evidence strongly indicates that the U.S. influence identified in the overall sample is driven by years with divided U.S. government. Tables 3 and 4 The specification controls for the size, age and composition of the country's active loan portfolio as well as population, income, degree of democratization and conflict. The specification also includes regional and year dummies while the reported z-statistics are based on country-clustered standard errors. The variable used to capture U.S. geopolitical interests in this analysis is diffUS, the difference between alignment on U.S. important UNGA votes and on other votes defined above (again lagged by one year because UNGA votes happen late in the year). Column 1 shows that, using the full sample, countries are more likely to receive disbursements when they make concessions to the U.S. on important UNGA votes.
Informal Influence in the World Bank
Column 2 limits the sample to years when the U.S. government was divided (again, lagged by one year).
The coefficient estimate for diffUS increases slightly as does its z-statistic. Conversely, the coefficient estimate in Column 3 (for the sub-sample when the U.S. government was not divided) shrinks by an order of magnitude and is far from significant. Again, the smaller sample size for Column 3 might account for the reduced significance but the dramatic drop in the point estimate clearly shows that overall the results are driven almost exclusively by years in which the U.S. government was divided.
6 (1) Full sample (Table 3 , Column 2 in Kilby (2013A)) (2) Divided government in U.S. (3) Undivided government in U.S. Table 4 turns to the disbursement allocation equation for the sample with positive disbursements. The dependent variable is the log of disbursements in millions of USD. Otherwise, the specification mirrors that of the selection equation except that it includes country fixed effects rather than regional dummies (since estimation is now by least squares). Column 1 replicates Table 3 , Column 2 in Kilby (2013A). As in the selection equation, diffUS enters with a positive, significant coefficient estimate, indicating that when countries make concessions to the U.S. on important UNGA votes they receive larger disbursements from the World Bank, ceteris paribus. Thus when countries make concessions to the U.S., they are both more likely to receive World Bank disbursements and, if they do, receive larger disbursements.
Column 2 again limits the sample to years where the U.S. government was divided (lagged one year).
Limiting the sample this way increases the coefficient slightly and it remains statistically significant.
Column 3 presents estimates based on the remaining observations. Again, the coefficient estimate for the non-divided government years is smaller (though the effect is not as dramatic as with the previous table) and not statistically significant. In short, we again have evidence that the exercise of U.S. influence over World Bank lending is more pronounced during years with a divided U.S. government. on the UNSC at the time IEG issued its PPAR rating (UNSC@PPAR). Non-permanent UNSC membership is well suited to capturing rapid changes in geopolitical importance because UN rules require countries to rotate off the council after a single 2 year term. The specification also includes dummies reflecting non-permanent membership on the UNSC at the time of the initial ICR rating (UNSC@ICR) and at project approval (UNSC@approval). If the geopolitical story is correct, UNSC membership in these earlier periods should have no link to IEG's updating of project ratings. Column 1 uses the full sample and replicates the results from Column 3 of Table 1 in Kilby and Michaelowa (2016) . The positive and significant coefficient estimate on UNSC@PPAR is consistent with updated ratings biased in favor of countries that temporarily hold a geopolitically important position. The insignificance of UNSC@ICR and UNSC@approval is consistent with this story, providing something of a placebo test. As before, Column 2 limits the sample to years where the U.S. government was divided (thereby reducing the availability of bilateral tools available to the administration).
The political economy of IEG ratings
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The estimated coefficient on UNSC@PPAR increases somewhat in magnitude and remains statistically significant while the estimated coefficients for UNSC@ICR and UNSC@approval remain insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient estimate for UNSC@PPAR for years where the U.S. government was not divided (Column 3) is much smaller and far from statistically significant. Again, the evidence suggests that the geopolitical effects uncovered in Kilby and Michaelowa are driven almost entirely by years where the U.S. government was divided.
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Global electioneering and World Bank lending
The final part of our analysis follows the disbursement speed section in Kersting and Kilby (2016) . In our original work we show that governments more aligned with the U.S. in terms of voting in the UNGA tend to see disbursements of their existing investment loans from the World Bank accelerate in the run-up to an election. In contrast, governments that more often vote against the U.S. position experience a deceleration of loan disbursement before an election. The specification we estimate here is identical to our previous work and given by:
The speed of disbursement of project in country is measured by the number of months it takes until a project has disbursed at least 25% of its total committed amount (akin to measuring speed by recording how many seconds a car takes to cover a quarter mile in drag racing); other variables are averaged over this period. !" is the UN voting alignment of country with the U.S. over the previous 12 month window, then averaged over the period from approval to 25% disbursed for project . (Here we abbreviate as to shorten the equation.) is initially a monthly indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if a competitive executive election is scheduled to be held within the next 12 months. When averaged over the months from project approval until 25% disbursement is reached, !" becomes continuous and can be interpreted as the proximity of pending elections, if any. The larger is !" , the larger the share of the observed project months that coincide with the run-up to an election. The vector contains project-specific, time varying variables while the vector represents country-level controls. The specification also includes dummies for loan type ( ) and sector board codes ( ) to control for unobservable differences among the various internal World Bank loan products and divisions. 8 The main hypothesis test in Kersting and Kilby (2016) is based on the coefficient for the interaction term !" × !" . A negative value for indicates faster disbursement in the run-up to a competitive executive election for governments aligned with the U.S.
Because the averaging implicit in this specification transforms our variable from a dummy (in a particular year) to a continuous variable (the percent of the project implementation period during a divided U.S. government), we utilize an interactive specification rather than splitting the sample at some arbitrary value. To parallel the previous split sample approach as closely as possible, we also define ! = 1 − ! and include both interactions:
The higher the value of , the greater the overlap between the relevant time interval of the project with periods when the U.S. government was divided.
9 Table 6 presents results. Column 1 replicates Table 2 , Column 2 in Kersting and Kilby (2016) and mirrors the specification in Equation (1). Column 2 adds the divided government variable and Column 3 also adds the divided and undivided interactions terms (the specification in Equation (2)).
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9 The sample mean for is 0.70. There are 294 observations with a value of 0 and 2,172 observations with value of 1; the remainder of the distribution is approximately normal with a conditional mean at 0.54. 10 Note that the specification includes fixed effect and so cannot also include the un-interacted variable since The results in Column 1 demonstrate three key points from Kersting and Kilby (2016) . First, the negative and significant coefficient on UN Alignment indicates that World Bank investment projects disburse more 23 quickly (fewer months to reach 25% disbursed) when countries are more aligned with the U.S. Second, the positive and significant coefficient on CEE indicates that World Bank investment projects disburse more slowly in the run-up to a competitive executive election than when there is no approaching election (more months to reach 25% disbursed)-if incumbent government support for the U.S. is relatively low.
Third, the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term CEE × UN Alignment indicates that World Bank investment projects disburse more quickly in the run-up to a competitive executive election than when there is no approaching election (fewer months to reach 25% disbursed)-if incumbent government support for the U.S. is relatively high. All these effects are both statistically and economically significant.
Column 2 adds the divided government variable, which enters with a negative and significant coefficient.
This indicates faster World Bank investment project loan disbursement in years with divided U.S.
government (even after controlling for the project approval date). Column 3 unpacks this effect, interacting both (the share of months with divided U.S. government) and (the share of months with undivided U.S. government) with , and their product.
Two things are apparent from Column (3). First, the divided U.S. government effect of Column (2) is fully accounted for by the alignment and electoral effects during these periods (i.e., the uninteracted term is no longer significant). Second, the overall alignment and electoral effects uncovered in Kersting and Kilby are driven by years with a divided U.S. government. The coefficient estimates for these variables interacted with are similar (or larger in absolute value) to their uninteracted counterparts in Column 1 and all are statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient estimates for the variables interacted with are much closer to zero and far from statistically significant. 
Conclusion
In recent years, a range of empirical studies have uncovered evidence that powerful donor countriesespecially the United States-exert influence over decision-making and resource flows in international financial institutions. In some settings, there is evidence that donors use bilateral aid and multilateral loans to achieve the same objectives (e.g., Kuziemko and Werker 2006 and Dreher et al. 2009A; Faye and Niehaus 2012 and Kersting and Marginal effect of an election on disbursement speed
Looking at the U.S., we argue that "why" and "when" are actually the same question. When the presidential administration is less able to secure the cooperation of Congress needed for bilateral action-that is, when the U.S. government is divided-the president can work around Congress by exerting his influence in multilateral organizations to accomplish the same ends. If this is the case, empirical evidence of U.S. influence in multilateral organizations should be stronger during years of divided U.S. government.
We explore this insight by re-examining the empirical findings of four previous studies that found evidence of U.S. influence in the World Bank, ranging from enforcement of conditionality to speed of loan disbursement to project ratings to electioneering. In all these studies, we find a similar pattern, namely statistically and quantitatively stronger results in years with a politically divided U.S. government. This pattern is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it re-enforces the interpretation of previous empirical patterns as evidence of U.S. influence over World Bank operations and decision-making.
Second, it suggests a similar approach for studying the influence of powerful countries in other international organizations, looking beyond the World Bank and-using other measures of executive power-beyond the United States. Third, it provides a tentative explanation for when and why governments opt for bilateral methods or instead exercise influence in a multilateral organization. Finally, the utility of international organizations as an added tool in the arsenal of the country's executive offers alternate answers to questions about the role of multilateral organizations in the global political economy.
